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SHIPOWNERS' LIMITATION
OF LIABILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL SEAFARING DISASTERS

I.

Introduction

Adherence to the principle of strict limitation of liability in any area of the law has been out of vogue since the
time of Winterbottom v. Wright. 1 This is true whether it be
in the area of products liability, master-servant relations,
or international air travel. The trend is to remove all
limitation on recoveries available under our law for death
or injury. 2 An exception is the limitation of liability in
iWinterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(1842), the liability of contracting parties to third persons
in selling chattels has expanded as no other area of the law.
Comparison can justifiably be made between what history has
shown can happen there; and what is presently happening in
maritime limitation law. The courts are expanding a doctrine
to fit the need as they see it. One of the strongest possible
arguments that is made for the adoption of international conventions on the subject is to prevent the haphazard growth that
took place in products liability as the courts made the law on
their own. See, PROSSER, TORTS, 3rd ed., 658-688 (1964).
2 See, for background
on recent attempts to avoid limitations
of liability in state laws, Pearson v. N.E. Airlines, 309 F.2d
553 (2d Cir. 1962), Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E. 2d
526 (1961), discussed in CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 690-721 (1963), for a further discussion of efforts to
avoid Massachusetts' strict limitation of death liability statute.
See also, Mass. Gen. Laws, C.229 § 2 (Supp. 1966), and accompanying
notes. The limit was raised to $30,000 in 1962, and $50,000 in
1965;
for the most recent case on this subject see, Eastern
Airlines v. Scott, 399 F.2d 14(3 Cir. 1968), which involved another
passenger's death in a Massachusetts air crash. This case, decided
in Pennsylvania, was in essence brought under admiralty jurisdiction
in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(264 F.Supp. 673) although framed in terms of a diversity suit. That
court below applied Pennsylvania law as to giving rise to the cause
of action in spite of the situs of the crash in Massachusetts, and
also held inapplicable the Massachusetts death limitation statute.
The Scott case on appeal in the first hearing held in accord with
Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), that that must be reversed,
as the proper rule was that "any state stuatue which generally provides remedies for tortious death can and should be drawn upon by
the maritime law in enforcing the federal cause of action", 603.
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maritime disasters. Here, in this watery domain, the narrowness that formerly dominated the field of products liability
continues to exist. Some critics condemn such strict limitation
as an anachronism in our modern society, while others continue
to cling to its principles steadfastly. 3 For example, it is
argued that the American airline industry, which is held to a
higher standard of liability than that of the Warsaw Convention,
cannot be compared to the shipping industry. 4 That "[tlhe
airline industry enjoys an ever increasing volume of business
and commensurate profit while the shipping industry is on a
descending plane, existing on marginal profits," 5 is but one
expression of this opinion made by John F. Gerity, Chairman of
the Association of Average Adjusters of the United States.
Although this paper deals with some of the more technical
points of this complex admiralty controversy, it should also
be of interest to all those -remotely concerned with international law, or the concepts of equity and jurisprudence.
This is because of the maze of international regulation in the
area and the self-contradiction that exists in American law on
the subject - principally, where damages are highest, the
degree of fault more culpable, and the injured party's need
for recovery greater, the liability is least or non-existent.
The clear implication was that Massachusetts law as the situs
of the crash was the only applicable law. On rehearing this
opinion was reversed and the District Court's opinion was
reinstated, 25. Hastie, Chief Judge, and others joined in a
strong dissent, at 32. The Supreme Court allowed this change
in the maritime liability principles of Tungus when they
refused to grant certiorai 37 U.S.L.W. 3209 (1969).
3 Hearings Before
the Merchant Marine and Fisheries SubCommittee of the Committee on Commerce on S.2313, S.2314, 87th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1962), [Subsequently cited-1962 Hearings];
Hearings Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Sub-Committee
of the Committee on Commerce on S.555, S. 556, 88th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1963),, [Subsequently cited-.1963 Hearings].
4 The major airlines have consistently balked at having
the limits raised and are at present operating on an ad hoc
agreement which was forced upon them by the United States
government. A recent decision has challenged the Warsaw
limits as depriving the plaintiff of equal protection of the
laws. Burdelly v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, No. 66 L10799,
Circuit Court of Cook County, November 7, 1968, 8 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 83(1969).
This position is highly questionable in light
of the maritime limitations that have been upheld, Murray v.
New York Cent. R. Co., 287 F.2d 152(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 945.
5 Gerity,
Address Before the Annual Meeting of the
Association of Average Adjusters of the United States,
October 3, 1968.
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The cyclical nature of the interest in this topic is one
reason for the peculiarities of the law. Interest reaches a
peak following a maritime disaster; piecemeal legislation is
rushed through and then the entire subject is forgotten. In
the modern age of supertankers and luxury liners American
maritime liability rests on the basis of a law that was passed
during one of those peaks of interest in 1851, when most shipping was still under sail. 6 That national legislation was
prompted by a series of maritime disasters climaxed by the
sinking of the Lexington, in which unlimited liability was
found to exist for the owner. 7 No substantial change was considered until the Morro Castle disaster of September 8, 1934,
demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing law. 8
Interest has
6 That

bill was sponsored by Hanibal Hamlin who was at that
time Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce and later VicePresident under Lincoln.. It was passed on March 3, 1851, with
"very scanty scrutiny of its provisions . . . The judicial
controversies latent in every clause of the third and fourth
sections were unperceived."
Putnam, The Limited Liability of
Ship-Owners For Master's Faults, 17 AM. L. REV. 1,14 (1883).
See also 23 Cong. Globe 713-720, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. (1851),
the congressional debates are reviewed in Sprague, Limitation
of Shipowners Liability, 12 N.Y.U. L. REV. 568, 577-78 (1935).
7 See,
New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank,
47 U.S. 344(1848).
A crate containing gold and silver bullion
was shipped aboard the defendant's vessel. He was not aware
of its value under a contract exonerating the shipowner for
any loss occasioned to the cargo. Due to gross negligence of
the crew the ship caught fire and burned and later sank. The
Court in allowing a full recovery of $18,000 for the value of
the bullion, held that though the owner might contract out
of his common law liability as a shipowner, he could in no
event contract out of the obligation to use due care.
8 That
tragedy pushed Congress to amend the law to some
degree;
extensive hearings were held on the matter, Hearings
Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
on H. 4550, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935).
[Subsequently
cited-1935 Hearings].
At page 7 of these Hearings the motivational force for their existence is reflected in the statement of Mr. William I. Sirovitch, "Now, Mr. Chairman . . ., we
have gone along in America since 1851 on a limited liability
law which was copied from and imitated the law of Great Britain,
limiting damages recoverable solely to the value of the ship
when it foundered, or the salvage value if the ship was saved.
So that we have the pitiful example in our country today of a
most tragic indictment of this law, so tragic in its nature
that I propose, as often as I can, to speak upon the floor of
Congress and call the attention of the traveling public to the
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waned again as repeated attempts to develop an international
system or to modify American law have failed. A crisis situation
presently exists.
International law is totally disjointed on the
subject, and the United States is at least 150 years behind other
nations in developing realistic legislation. The needed catalyst
to produce change may have just recently taken place.
In the fog of March 18, 1967, some seventeen miles off
Land's End, England, the Torrey Canyon, then one of the world's
ten largest tankers, ran hard aground on Seven Stones Reef,
setting off a chain of legal disputes that will not be put to
rest for decades.
The wrecked tanker, carrying a cargo of 118,000 tons of
Kuwait crude oil, was owned by the Barracuda Tanker Corporation,
a Liberian-based subsidiary of Union Oil of California. 9
Operating out of Bermuda, voyage-chartered by the British
Petroleum Co., Ltd. phose-stock is 52% owned by the British
Crown), registered in Liberia and manned by an Italian master
and crew, the Torrey Canyon was insured by British and American
underwriters in a ratio of 60/40. Further, the ship was stranded
on a reef in international waters, abandoned by the owners,
claimed by a Dutch salvage company, and completely destroyed by
10
British naval forces using rockets and napalm.
Approximately 80,000 tons of crude oil were swept into the
sea by the churning tides of the English Channel as the ship
lay helpless in the water. The residue from this giant oil
slick soon coated the beaches and coves of Normancy and Wales,
damaging foreshore property, ruining the lucrative tourist
11
trade, and killing every form of plant and animal life.
fact that when the Morro Castle was sunk she was insured for
$4,000,000, which went to the Ward Line, [the owner] but for
the 135 people who lost their lives, and the countless men and
women who were injured, and for the loss of cargo, the total
amount of money that these 135 people can sue for, on the basis
of the limitation of liability amounts to $19,000 or $20,000."
As a matter of fact the Ward Line fearing that their petition
for limitation would be denied settled the claims totaling
$13,500,000 for the sum of $890,000 which was some 40% below
the value finally fixed for the claims. 17 Am. Mar. Cas. 895
(S.D. N.Y. 1939), (settlement).
9 GILL, BOOKER
& SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY CANYON 17
(1967), [Subsequently cited-GILL]; for denial of corporate
relationship by Union Oil, see N.Y. Times, July 18, 1967, at
33 col. 8.
1 0 GILL, supra note 9 at 33,41.
llTorrey Canyon Pollution and Marine Life, a report by
the Plymouth laboratory of the Marine Biological Association
of the United Kingdom, ed. Smith (1968); also for accounts
of the devastation, Life, April 14, 1967, at 34, N.Y. Times
June 9, 1967, § M, at 80, coll.
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Damages will run into several millions of dollars, including
the value of the ship and cargo which were lost, insured to
the extent of $16.5 million; this will be the single most
12
expensive seafaring disaster in history.
This situation dramatically presents the deficiencies
that currently exist in the law relative to shipowner's
limitation of liability. In spite of the tremendous damage
acknowledged to have been done to many innocent third parties,
their recovery will at best be a pittance in relation to
actual damages suffered. If their actions are brought in the
United States against the American corporate parent, it is
likely that recovery will be severely limited or completely
unavailable. If the actions are brought in Liberia, where
the ship was registered, one can only specualte as to the outcome, since no major maritime claims of this nature have ever
been filed there. 3 An action in Britain would yield the most
for the claimants, but the amount would still be meager in
comparison to the actual damages. What, then, is the basis for
this system that seemingly serves to protect the shipowner with
such a callous disregard for the rights of others?
II.

Sources of Limitation Law
A.

Early Sources

Roman law made liability co-extensive with the damages
for accidents on land and sea alike. In each the rule was
full compensation without regard to the value of the instrumentality causing the injury. 14 However, this concept was
modified by the principle.of the noxae deditio. 1 5 In effect,
this was a law of abandonment whereby the owner of a slave or
an inanimate object could free himself from the liability
created by his slave or chattel by giving over the same to the
injured party. This principle has been reflected in the
12 Marshall, The Black Wake of the Torrey Canyon, UNITED
STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (December 1967) 39. Without including the value of the pr.operty destroyed on shore
the Torrey Canyon was insured for $5 million more than the
previous most expensive wreck, the Andrea Doria.
131963 Hearings, supra, note 3,,at 80. Statement made by
Oscar R. Houston, before the Committee;
"I happen to have
drawn the maritime laws of Liberia, and I think they are a
very good set of laws, but there has never been, so far as I
know an
admiralty case tried in the courts of Monrovia,....
1 5 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 30 (1881), Holmes suggests that
the origin of this practice may have been something other than
the goodness of heart of the wrongdoer. He indicates that it
was an expiatory act to placate threatened vengence, at 10.
ill

development of admiralty law in civil law countries.
Other authorities believe it was in the formative years
of trade development of the fourteenth century that the real
concept of maritime limitation of liability had its beginning.16
The earlier medieval maritime codes were silent as to this
principle of limitation. No limitation was found in the laws of
Oleron or in the laws of the City of Trani. The Valencian Code,
however, declared that ship-owners were not personally responsible
for loans negotiated by the shipmaster unless the master had acquired something in the nature of a power of attorney from them.
The Consulato del Mare of about the same period stated that the
owner responded for.damages through his ownership in the vessel.
More particularly, he was not liable beyond his interest in the
vessel for goods laden on the deck or for maritime loans
negotiated by the master.
During this era of Medi-terranean commerce, expanding trade
routes increased both the need for capital investment and the
risk of loss. No longer could the merchant afford to travel
with his goods or to be fully responsible for the acts of his
agents. These early limitation laws -provided a form of subsidy
and encouragement. In 1624, Grotius wrote that it had long
been the settled law in Holland that the dwner was liable for
interest
the master's acts only to the extent of his ownership
17
carried.
it
which
cargo
the
and
vessel
the
in
It should be pointed out that the concepts enumerated
above refer mainly to the limitation of the shipowner's
liability in regard to contractual agreements made by the shipmaster. It is said, therefore, that the true source of
admiralty limitation is in contracts law and the vague beginnings of the corporate form. According to this theory the
limitation principle arose from the adoption of the contract de
commande of the medieval period. This was a system developed
during the Middle Ages by which a merchant might entrust his
goods to another to be used in trade and limit his liability to
the amount entrusted. 1 8 This entrusting by a capitalist to an
active managing agent is the origin of corporate protection.
Each trading venture was an early counterpart of the "judicial
person", and the capitalist incurred no liability beyond the
amount so entrusted to the enterprize. In this respect, each
voyage of a ship was considered a separate entity.
Limitation of shipowner's liability for tortious acts,
1 6 putnam,

supra note 6 at 1, 6.
1 7 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, Book 2 ch. 11, 13
(Campbell transl. 1901).
1 8 The Rebecca,
20 Fed. Cases 373, 376 (No. 11, 619) (C.C.D.
Me. 1831).
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rather than contract obligations of the shipmaster, seems to:
have developed more rapidly as the spirit of decentralization of
business activity-increased. There developed the need to'protect
those who were willing to risk capital in ventures that would benefit the state, and the-overriding concern was to encourage shipping
in one way or another. Just as countries of the world today desire to
possess basic industries, nations earlier believed that a
strong seafaring tradition would yield both wealth and
protection. Thus, Grotius, writing in De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
was one of the strongest proponents of the public need for
employing the limitation principle, contending that if owners
were perpetually in fear of unlimited liability for the acts of
their masters, it would be detrimental to society as a whole.
The preamble to the first British limitation act also gives
further indication of the importance of the principle of protecting maritime commerce:It is of the greatest consequence and importance to
this kingdom to promote the increase in the number
of ships and to prevent any discouragement to
merchants and others from being interested and concerned therein.
7 Geo. III c 15 (1734)
France and the United States had similar statements of belief
in the importance of the maritime industry in their early
limitation laws. 1 9
By the middle of the nineteenth century four distinct
systems of limitation had developed. The English system limited
the shipowner's liability to the value of a fund fixed on the
,basis of the ship's tonnage before the injury. Under this
concept there was a continuing personal liability for the
owner, but the claimant's recovery was limited to a maximum
amount independent of the injuries suffered. The French
system of limitation allowed personal responsibility to cease
when the shipowner took the affirmative step of abandoning to
the claimants his interest in the ship and freight. 2 0 German
law made the ship subject to an in rem action ab initio, but did
not hold the owner subject to any personal liability.2 1 The
!9MASS. GEN LAWS, c. 122 §1-3(1823); MAINE REV. STAT.,
c. 14 §8-10(1822).
2 0 This civil law concept
was an outgrowth of the noxae
deditio, HOLMES, supra note 15, at 30.
21While the status of Germany is questionable because of
the political division of that nation, both France and Britain
have accepted the 1957 Treaty. Singh, International Conventions
of Merchant Shipping, 8 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS 1064(1963).
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American system provided that the liability of the shipowner
would not exceed the value of the vessel following the
occurrence that gave rise to liability.
B.

The British System

Limitation of liability for shipowners was nonexistent in
the ancient law of England. In The Volant, decided in 1842, it
is recited that the law was formerly that the owners were bound
to make good for any damage, even when that amount exceeded the
value of their vessel and freight. The first act limiting
liability was 7 Geo. III, c. 15 (1734), which protected the owner
beyond the value of the ship and freight, but only in the case
of loss of cargo by the fault of master and crew. Various
modifications of this rule took place during the next 150 years.
In 1813, the rule of limitation was extended to ordinary acts of
negligence Outside the privity of the owner. The owner's
liability was personal and became fixed in case of collision at
the value of the injuring ship at the moment before the occurrence.22 While assuring their protection the rule encouraged
23
This
ship-owmers to keep their vessels in marginal repair.
fault was overcome with respect to death claims by the act of
1854,24 which stated for the first time the concept of the fixed
sum certain. The act provided that the injuring vessel was
assumed to have a minimum value of 15 pounds sterling per registered ton.
The measuring of liability under the English rule by a
fixed standard independent of the amount of damages has several
critical features. The limitation statute allows protection
to owners of British or foreign ships for liability occurring
without their actual fault or "privity". The "privity" concept, however, is a wedge that the court may employ to open the
door for unlimited liability to the owner in certain cases.
This has happened in the area of products liability and is
happening in admiralty law. 2 5 The extent of the opening is still
to be ascertained.
2 2 See, Acts; 53 Geo.
2 3 putnam, supra
note
24 Acts, 17&18 Vict.,

III, c. 159 (813).
6, at 13.
c. 184, §§504,505(1854). For a concise
history of British maritime limitation law see, COLOMBOS,
LAW OF THE SEA, 352-55(1967).
INTERNATIONAL
2 5 "Privity or knowledge" is one of
the most fluid concepts
in the Limitation Act solely dependent "on the facts of particular
Courts in
cases." Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406,411(1943).
under
privity
find
to
quick
the United States at least are more
the Act in regard to corporate shipowners, id. The earliest
cases found privity only when high level officers had knowledge,
however more recent cases have disallowed limitation when
114

The fund upon which a British recovery is based consists
of an arbitrary assignment of a value per ton of a ship's
registered tonnage, plus or minus certain small variable
factors, such as crew space and the engine compartment. The
underlying thought behind this system can be analogized to
domestic workmen's compensation in that it was not expected to
allow all damaged parties full recovery, but some recovery was
available to all. Also, since the'size of the liability fund
is determined by tonnage before any accident, the liability
fund is wholly independent of any circumstances surrounding
the accident. It will be seen that under the American system
the injured parties prospects of any-recovery are dependent on
the survival of the -offending vessel. The British plan, therefore, assures that there will be recovery of at least some
amount, and at the same time it provides that all shipowners
have a definite amount-of liability which can be adequately
insured against.
Two possible disadvantages to the British system are at
once apparent. First, in times of steady inflation the amount
fixed per ton soon becomes unrealistically small. 2 6 Second,
the system fails to discriminate between classifications of
vessels. While large passenger ships and oil tankers are likely
to do more damage in a single accident than a standard commercial transport vessel, all vessels are treated the same way.
When a relatively small vessel causes great damage,*recovery
is inadequate. Meanwhile, owners of larger vessels carry an
unduly large insurance burden.
The fixed fund system has continued to be the dominant
factor in Britain's position toward maritime limitation of
liability down to the present day. 2 7 It Also has been adopted
supervisory personnel or even non-supervisory personnel had
knowledge of facts that would impute knowledge to the owners.
See, Note, 68 YALE L. J. 1676, 1688, n. 84(1959). That same
Note indicates that the doctrine of privity has been treated
more narrowly in Great Britain, at 1686. In a recent case a
District Court judge went so far as to declare that the forseeability of disaster by a ship's master could give the owner
"knowledge" within the meaning of the Limitation Act. "The
Master could and reasonably should have foreseen and anticipated
the danger of a disasterous fire, with the possibility of
explosion, in failing to prevent smoking in the pressence
(Emphasis
• . . [of a highly volatile fertilizer substance]."
by the court) Petition of Republic of France, 171 F. Supp. 497,
The appellate court in rather ambiguous
508 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
language did not follow the lower court's extension of the
privity concept as the decision was reversed. Republic of France
v. United States, 290 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1961).
261962 Hearings, supra note 3, at 19, 77 137ff.
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as the latest proposal toward an international rule in the
Brussels'Convention of 1957.
C.

The French System

The Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV compiled under
direction of Colbert and published in 1681, was truly the
precursor of the continental approach toward maritime liability limitation. Its far reaching influence is illustrated
by the fact that the Ordonnance was incorporated into the
maritime codes of France, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy,
Russia, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina and Chile with
little or no modification and it had a large influence on the
28
German code.
A conflict has arisen as to the exact scope of the limitation under the Ordonnance. Some commentators believe that
the owner was protected only for the negligence of the shipmaster, stressing that the source of the French concept was
the noxae deditio.. Others say that because of the developments
of the Middle Ages all actions ex contractu of the master were
also to be covered. The wording of the statute is ambiguous.
II. The owners of ships shall be answerable for
the deeds of the master; but shall be discharged
[by] abandoning their ship and freight.
Intricate rules were developed as to the actual abandonment.
These were particularly concerned with the type of title that
was transferred and the time within which the owner could
29
relieve his liability by abandonment. ,
The French, however, faced increasing contraction of their
merchant marine with broader limitation provisions, until finally
the legislature relieved shipowners from liability for all acts
of the master in 1841. An interesting comment as to why such
strict limitation was adopted in France, when at the same time
nmch more restrictive provisions existed in American and British
law, is found in this statement:

".

.

. [a] certain protection

was necessary to the more timid and less adventurous character
2 7 The

Merchant Shipping Act, 57&58 Vict., c. 60, §§§. 503,
504(1894), also, for further changes in the Act, See, Merchant
Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and others) Act, 63&64 Vict.,
c. 32, §. 2(1900), Merchant Shipping Act of 1906, 6 Edw. VII,
c. 48, §§. 69-71(1906), Act, ll&12 Geo. V, c. 28, §. 1(1921),
Merchant Shipping Act of 1958, 6&7 Eliz. II, c. 62(1958).
2 8 The Main v.
Williams, 152 U.S. 122,
(1894).
2 9 See, Putnam,
supra note 6, at 8-10, for a statement on
the development of French law of maritime liability limitation
in regard to abandon, time of making, and the title transfered.
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of our [the French] merchants; that each nation had special
tendencies and a particular genius which prudent legislators
should take account of."'30 The French in 1935, adopted the
1925 International Convention of Limitation of Liability for
Shipowners. 3 1 This convention was an unfortuante mixture of
concepts that limited a shipowner's liability much too severely.
It provided that in no case could liability exceed a fixed sum
based on a value per ton of the ship, and at the same time that
the owner's liability could be limited to nothing if the vessel
sank. This Convention never gained widespread acceptance, but
was adopted by France because it conformed to her stringent
limitation policy. In 1959, the French adopted the 1957
Brussels Convention on the same subject. 32 The later convention, as noted above, was closely patterned after the British
limitation policy of a fixed fund.
D.

The German System

While the German approach to limitation was similar to
the French, it differed in one significant aspect: the owner
was never held personally liable for injuries caused by his
ship. 3 3 Rather, the injured party had to bring an in rem
action against the vessel. In the French system the abandonment of the vessel was a condition precedent to the owner's
limitation of personal liability, whereas in the German
system, the abandonment was not a condition but merely a con34
sequence.
The extent to which other countries have followed German
law in this significant difference is not agreed upon. One
author suggests that Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have followed
the German system. However, the Maritime Law Association of
the United States refutes this proposition. 35 In any event
these three nations did adopt the Brussels Convention of 1924.
The current status of German law on the subject is somewhat unclear. Germany participated in the Brussels Convention
30 Id., at
3 1 PBritish

10.
Shipping Laws, supra note 21, at 1064.

3 2 Id.
3 3S-prague,

supra note 6, at 571, citing SIEVEKING, THE GERMAN

LAW OF THE SEA, 86.
3 4 Sprague,
id. at 571, also Putnam, supra note 6, 10, 11.
35
Putnam, supra note 6, suggests that Norway, Sweden and
Denmark followed the German system. The Maritime Law Association
of the United States refutes this, Document 196, 1058, 1935
Hearings, supra note 8, at 236. The three nations did adopt the
Brussels Convention of 1924, British Shipping Laws, supra note 21,
at 1058.
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of 1924, but never signed that treaty. 36 West Germany signed
37
the 1957 Convention but has not yet ratified the treaty.
The state of East German law is difficult to determine because
of the political division of Germany.
III.

The United States System
A.

History

Like British law, the early law concerning maritime
limitation of liability for shipowners in the United States
provided for no limitation. This situation continued until
1848 when the Lexington case forcefully brought home to shipowners the extent of their possible liability. 3 8 The early
statutes of Massachusetts and Maine show that the American
seafaring states were well- aware of the hazard to shipowners.
The bill enacted in March of 1851, was primarily designed to
put United States owners on the same footing as British
shipowners. 3 9 The legislators, while recognizing the rights
of injured parties, were more concerned with protecting
America's infant seafaring industry.
The Bill was a composite of the earlier colonial statutes
on the subject and the even earlier British Law. 4 0 Section
one of the bill was commonly known as the "Fire Statute", because it completely protected the owner from liability if his
ship and cargo were consumed by fire. Section two concerned
the shipment of valuable items such as gold or silver and
contained the stipulation that unless their shipment was disclosed in a manifest or bill of lading, the owner was completely free from liability. Section three is the most
relevant because it is the basis of present day American law
on the subject:
And be it further enacted, that the liability of
the owner or owners of any ship or vessel . . .
for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or
forfeiture, done, occasioned or incurred without
the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners,
shall in no case exceed the amount or value of
3 6 British

Shipping Laws, supra note 21, at 1050, 1057.
at 1064. West Germany has not as yet ratified the
treaty, but did sign the treaty. Further, it is doubtful that
that signature alone would amount to self-ratification because
of the narrow scope of such instances under the Basic Law of
the German Federal Republic, Article 59°
3 8 Supra
note 7.
391935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 7.
4 0 See, Act of March
3, 1851, 31st Cong., ch. 43, Stat. 635.
3 7 1d.
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the interest of such owner or owners, respectively,
in such ship or vessel and the frieght then pending.
Section four added that if the value remaining was insufficient
to meet all claims against the owner, he could discharge his
obligation by making a pro-rata distribution to the parties, or
by turning over his interest in the vessel to a competent trustee
for the claimants. Section five extended the privilege of
limitation of liability to charter parties who "man, victual and
41
navigate" the vessel, essentially as an owner would.
While the statute covered other details of the limitation
situation, notably that the liability of the master was not
limited, it was the first five sections that articulated the
fundamentals of American maritime limitation of liability.
First, owners could invoke the limitation principle only if
they could first show lack of privity to the incident giving
rise to the damages. Second, the amount recoverable by injured parties was strictly construed to be limited to the value
of the vessel. Third, discharge of all personal claims against
the owner could be aciieved by a pro-rata distribution of the
value of his ship following the incident. The enactment of
this statute represented an adoption by the United States of
a hybrid of the continental and British limitation principles.
That was the closest point ever reached toward achieving an
international norm; since then only divergence in the systems
has taken place.
B.

Court Interpretations of American Limitation Law

In the years immediately following the passage of the 1851
Act the courts of this country were guided by one major premise
concerning the legislation: that protection of the shipping
In the case of Norwich Co. v. Wright 4 3
industry was essential.4 2
the Supreme Court defined the terms of the third section of the
Act;
". . . shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the
interest of such owner . . . in such vessel," to mean that the

owner's liability was measured according to the value of the
vessel following the accident. The Court, therefore, construed
the limitation principle more strictly than the British statute
4 lThe

modern term to describe such a charter would be a,

"Bareboat Charter".
4 2 Eyer,

Shipowner's Limitation of Liability - New Directions
for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 374(1964).
"The
vagueness of the Limitation Act and its failure to provide intelligible guidelines for administration provided the setting for
judicial lawmaking seldom equaled."
4380 U.S. 104(1871).
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upon which its American counterpart was supposedly fashioned.
Under the comparable British law the level of possible liability
was fixed at the value of the ship the moment before the occurrence, thus there would be some liability even if the vessel
were a total wreck. The stricter limitation was a greater aid
to the American shipowners because it often limited their
liability to less than the amount of capital they had invested
in the venture, if the vessel were destroyed in the accident
the owner's liability was eliminated. Further protection was
brought about by the Court in a later opinion, The City of
Norwich,4 5 where it was held that the owner's interest subject
to the claims of the injured was exclusive of hull insurance.
The Morro Castle case cited earlier illustrates a situation
where four million dollars of insurance was available to the
owners to cover their losses, yet liability to all claimants
could have been limited to twenty thousand dollars because
the vessel was a total wreck. 4 6 These cases demonstrated the
courts' willingness to protect shipowners, but at the same

44 The valuation under the British statute of 1813,(53 Geo.
III, c. 159) had been construed to be the value of the vessel,
in the case of collision, at the moment before impact, Brown v.
This was
Wilkinson, 15 M&W 391, 153 Eng. Rep. 902, 903(1846).
the law in effect when Hamlin, in the debates of Congress of
1851, said, "I desire to call the attention of the Senate to
a singular point-this bill is predicated on what is now the
20 Appendix, U.S. Cong. Globe 332, 31st Cong.,
British law."
2nd Sess.(1851). At the time of the speaking of those words,
the British statute of 1813, was the law to which Hamlin was
refering. The Supreme Court of the United States in Norwich,
id. adopted a position that clearly rejected the English
court's interpretation in the Brown case at 903. The value of
the vessel after collision is purely speculative at any
previous point in time, and always diminished; thus, the Court
more severely limited liability. But see, Eyer, supra note 47
at 374, the Court ".

. . reject[ed]

the more restrictive English

law which Congress thought it was adopting." The reference of
the courts in regard to the historical basis of limitation of
liability in maritime matters seemingly has always followed the
position of Judge Ware's analysis contained in the Rebecca,
supra note 18, and this may account for its seeming disregard of
British law principles on the subject. See also, Baer, "Down To
The Seas Again," 40 N.C. L. REV. 377,398(1962).
45118 U.S. 468(1886).
4 6 0ne of the most
striking examples of the improper functioning of this phase of interpretation is seen in the case,
The Princess Sophia, 61 F. 2d 339, 344-55 (9th Cir. 1932),
There existed only a $600
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 604(1933).
limitation fund available to cover all losses including 350
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time they4enerated animosity sufficient to cause change in
Congress.
C.

The Sirovich Amendment

In the hearings prior to the enactment of any modifications,
the tone of those testifying was reminiscent of William Jennings
Bryan's eulogies on the "cross of gold". Suddenly, those faults
so long hidden in the seven sections of the Limitation Act were
brought to light in the blazing heat of the Morro Castle. 4 8 The
traveling public were going to be protected at least when they
were killed or injured. 4 9 However, the initial bill was introduced by William Sirovich to create the funded sum certain
system for all types of injuries as had been adopted in England
in 1862. 5 0 The supporters of the Sirovich amendment argued
that if the original purpose of the American legislation was
to put United States owners on a parity with those in Great
Britain, these changes were necessary in American law because
of British legislative changes. 5 1 The main stimulus was, of
course, the inequity of the old system.5 2
There were arguments against the adoption of the proposed
amendment. The first of these was that it unfairly operated
against poorer quality ships. The measure was designed to treat
deaths, and the Court held that the City of Norwich, id. had
settled the question of the disposition of insurance proceeds,
at 354.
4 7 See, 1935
Hearings, supra. note 8.
481d. at 7, ". . . This administration is founded upon the

fundamental concept of a 'new deal'. We have been the tragic
victims of the old, rotten deal and raw deal. We have the
merchantile marine operators who are coming here to us and asking
for subsidies to help them. . . [T]he traveling public . . . are
the ones who are paying the frieght; . . . in the name of every-

thing that stands for liberality and freedom and tranquility. . .
Id. at 14.
4 9 This is in reference
to the fact that the $60 per ton fund
which was established would only be used to increase liability if
death or personal injury were involved.
501935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 1,2. In 1862, Britain
repealed her prior law on the subject which established only a
funded sum certain for death and personal injury claims, Act,
17&18 Vict., c. 104, §§ 504(1854), and substituted in its place
legislation that gave for every ton of the ship, for the loss of
life or personal injury 15 pounds sterling, and 8 pounds for
-

ordinary collision damages, Act, 25&26 Vict., c. 63, §. 54(1862).

511935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 74,75.
5 2 Id. at 48, 49.
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both luxury liners and the "tramps" the same way, on a basis of
tonnage rather than worth or number of passengers carried. 5 3
Second, it was submitted that the proposed changes in American
law would not put the United States back on a parity with
54
Britain but would in fact be much harsher on American owners.
Particularly in dispute was the increased opportunity of finding
the owner privy to the master's negligence, thereby diminishing
the owner's chances of limiting his liability. This arose from
the phrase contained in section 181 of the amendment:
"The
privity or knowledge of the master of a vessel, or of the
superintendent or managing agent of the owner or owners thereof,
shall be deemed the privity or knowledge of the owner or owners
of such vesselo,"5 5 This would have provided a great expansion
of the privity concept beyond the original act, where privity
of the owner meant that some authority higher than the ship's
master must have knowledge; These basic complaints regarding
the proposed change in the law were embodied in a separate bill
56
proposed by the American Steamship Owners' Association.
Nonetheless, the furor created by the Morro Castle fire and
the House Hearings resulted in certain changes in the law being
made regarding death and personal injury claims. While retaining
the previous limitation concept for all vessels, the legislation
directed itself to the situation in which damages exceeded the
amount available for distribution and which involved death
or personal injury. The statute provided that then, and only
then, a $60.00 per ton sum certain was available for distribution
to such claimants injured on seagoing vessels. 5 7 The privity
concept was also changed, but only in relation to the death and
personal injury claims. In all other respects "privity" remained
as it was. 58
5 3 1d.

at 15.
541d. at 99.
5
-Ijd. at 2.
5 61d. at 91
- 97, extensive discussion surrounding this proposal is found at pages 97ff of the Hearings.
5749 Stat. 1479(1963), 46 U.S.C. §183(1958).
The situation
envisioned here is where the vessel is a total loss and according
to the prior law the owner's liability would be non-existent;
now, in regard to personal injury and death claims there would
exist a fund to allow some recovery. While the limitation option
is open to owners of all vessels the necessity of providing a $60 per ton sum certain in case of personal injury or death is only
required in relation to seagoing vessels. There is a clear dispute,
however, in the situation where a seagoing vessel is operating on
inland5 waters as to whether it remains a seagoing vessel.
8 1d. These
amendments altered other portions of the Act to
some extent. Some restrictions were raised on the right to limit
liability and there was a requirement for separate limitation funds
for each "distinct occasion".
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This is the present state of American statutory law. While
British law has attempted to remain somewhat current by raising
the amount available in the limitation funds, there has been no
parallel effort in United States legislation. 5 9 Except in death
and personal injury actions, which are governed by the Sirovich
amendment adopted in 1935, the standards of liability with which
today's courts must deal are those established in the 19th century.
The courts reiterate the maxium that the act must be liberally
construed, yet there are signs that they grow tired of defending
such miniscule recoveries. 6U American judges are now moving in
an uncharted area while softening the harshness of the law and
narrowing its broad sweep. This change can be seen in the
reasoning of the case In Re Independent Towing Company, 6 1 where
an insurance
shipowners' limitation of liability was denied 6 to
2
statute.
action
direct
state's
a
under
carrier
Also to be considered is the noticeable trend against
the principle of limitation itself. In the recent
case of In re Petition of the A. C. Dodge, Inc., 282
F. 2d 86 (2d Cir.- 1960), this trend was clearly
reflected. . .:

'However, we think that ambiguous

language in statutory provisions relating to limitation of liability should be resolved in favor of
interpretations increasing the instances where full
recoveries from the limiting vessel are possible.'
As in the law of products liability the inroads of judge-made
maritime law are beginning to be felt. Even similar terms
such as implied, or express warranties, and a readiness to
63
find "privity", are present.
D.

United States Choice-of-Law Rule

The Unites States' concept of conflicts law in this field
5 9 British

modifications and upward revisions of the per ton
value can be seen throughout the statutes cited in note 27 supra.
6 0 See,
note 42 supra.
61242 F. Supp. 950, 955 (E.D. La. 1965).
6 2 See,

Note, Direct Action Against Marine Insurer Unavailability of Limitation of Shipowner's Liability As a Defense,
40 TUL. L. REV. 150(1965).
6 3 "These
judicial developments include (1) the 'personal
contract' doctrine whereby a shipowner is held fully liable to

(2)
charterers for breach of express or implied warranties;
(3) a readiness to find 'privity or
higher standards of care;
(4) the requirement that the owner prove lack of
knowledge';
'privity or knowledge'; and (5) the preservation of claimants'
rights at common law . . ."

Eyer, supra note 47, at 377, 378.
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is detrimental because it draws many cases under the American
principle of limitation that could be more properly decided
on the basis of another system. The way was opened for applying the American limitation of liability law to owners of
foreign vessels by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of The Scotland, in 1881.64 In 1935, this modification
of the original Act of 1851, was adopted by Congress by adding
to the Act that the provisions limiting liability were open
to the owners of ships "whether American or foreign".6 5
United
States choice-of-law decisions still hold that the forum's law

applies to limitation of shipowner's liability, while foreign
substantive law may apply to all other aspects of the case.
Not only is the difference between substance and procedure
often difficult to ascertain, but the application of such a
mechanical rule is incorrect when it always leads to one result
when justice demands another. Authorities in the field feel
that limitation of liability, should be applied as a part of the
other even more
substantive law of the locus delecti, or upon
66
reasonable bases such as relevant contacts.
The case which is cited as stating the current American6 7
choice-of-law rule is Oceanic Navigation Company v. Mellor.
There, in a situation involving the liability of a British shipowner for acts of negligence done to a British national on the
high seas aboard a British flagship, Mr. Justice Holmes ruled
that the American limitation law should apply. In arriving at
this controversial opinion, he merely said,
It is true that the foundation for a recovery upon a
British tort is an obligation created by British law.
But it also is true that the laws of the forum may
decline altogether to enforce that obligation on the
ground that it is contrary to the domestic policy,
or may decline to enforce it except within such limits
68
as it may impose.
Holmes's position has been interpreted as a strengthening
of the meaningless substanceL-procedure dichotomy; and although
this dichotomy has been increasingly criticized as a choice-of6 4 See,

The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24(1881); 49 Stat. 960(1935),
46 U.S.C. § 183 (1958).
6 5 Id.
66-Extensive articles have been written on this facet alone
of the maritime limitation concept. See, Comment, 17 U. CHI. L.
REV. 388, 393 (1950), Knouth, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1(1949), Note,
Limitation of Shipowner's Liability in American Courts, 78 U.
PA. L. REV. 393, 400 (1930).
67233 U.S. 730 (1913).
6 8 1d.
at 732. See, for discussion of Titanic case 17 U. CHI.
L. REV, at 393 supra note 71.
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law rule, 6 9 it has been followed consistently. In the Western
Farmer, 7 0 which involved a collision in the English Channel of
an American vessel and a Norwegian vessel, where the suit was
brought by a German corporate owner of lost cargo, Judge Learned
"It is necessary to say no more than that the Titanic
Hand said:
[Oceanic Navigation case, citation omitted]. . . finally settled
it for us that such statutes are part of the remedy, and that
71
the law of the forum applies."
E.

United States Law of Damage Division

One further distinctive feature of American maritime law regarding shipowner liability relates to the law of damage division.
The basic United States position on assessing damages between two
vessels involved in a collision, where each has been guilty of
contributing fault,72 is that each vessel is assessed one-half
of the combined damages. The degree of culpability of one party
is of no consequence in apportioning damages. This concept was
first recognized in the United States in the 1858 case of the
73
Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson.
This doctrine has been subjected to much criticism because
it protects the wrong party in many circumstances. It does not
require much imagination to realize that in many instances one
vessel may be guilty of a greater degree of fault than the other,
In the case of N. M. Patterson & Sons,
and yet damages are shared.
6 9 Comment,

"Maritime Limitations of Liability: a Study in
Conflicts of Laws," 1962 DUKE L. J. 259, 266, 267 (1962).
70210 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1954).
7 1 1d. at 757.
But see, Comment, supra note 69 at 265, where
the author in discussing a Supreme Court case later in time than
the Titanic, supra note 74, Black Diamond S.S. Co. v. Robert
Stewart & Sons, (The Norwalk Victory), 336 U.S. 386 (1949),
suggests that that case by inference may have modified the Titanic,
"drawn from dictum and implications of the Norwalk Victory that
in an appropriate situation for application of foreign substantive
law, a foreign limitation of liability will be applied if the
creating state considers it substantive, absent compelling policy
reasons to the contrary." This has not yet occured, and the
Western Farmer, did not even consider the modification, note 75.
72

"Fault" in this sense under maritime doctrines is considered to be an actionable tortious act or ommission. Such an
occurrence as is described above is referred to as a "mutual

fault" collision.
7358 U.S. 171(1854).

See, the case of The Sapphire, 85 U.S.

51(1873), where it is set out at 56, "It is undoubtably the rule

in admiralty that where both vessels are in fault the sums representing the damage sustained by each must be added together and
the aggragate divided between the two. .
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.

.

If one in fault has

Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 7 4 a district court went so far as to
say that the Supreme Court did not really mean in the Sapphire
case that damages were to be divided equally in situations
where the degrees of fault were qrossly disproportionate, but
the case was reversed on appeal. 5 The appellate court there
found that the lower court's basic misconception was that the
term "mutual fault" was interpreted to mean "equal fault".
The court stated, ". . . the rule [equal division of damages]
prevails in all cases where there is mutual fault, even though
one of the vessels may have been much more in fault than the
other.,,76
The English, from whom America adopted the equal division
doctrine, discarded it in 1913, and substituted for it the
doctrine of comparative negligence. Now courts in the United
States are growing restless under the equal division doctrine,
much as they are in the general area of limitation of liability.
Judge Learned Hand wrote,
If we were free to choose, we might well agree at
least to the law of proportional fault. That has
now become the rule in collisions in most civilized
countries;
and it is becoming more and more in
general use in torts of negligence ashore. It responds to the feeling of most people that it us just
that lapses from the care that a situation demands
may be of different moral quality, and should have
diffeient consequences.77
What Judge Hand was referring to as the "rule in most
civilized countries" was the Brussels International Convention
of 1910. Articles 2-4 provide a uniform standard that has
been accepted throughout the world. Although the United States
was present at the Convention, it stands almost alone in having
78
refused to accept the measures there adopted.
Generally, therefore, American law in the field of limitation
of maritime liability can be criticized on two fronts.
First,
the law is out of step with the times, and second, the law is out
of step with that of the world community. Refinements in the
law have been made by other nations since 1851, and most of these
refinements have been reflected in international conventions
sustained no injury, it is liable for half the damages sustained
by the other, though that other was also at fault. .. .
74209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
75324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963), citing The Atlas, 93 U.S.
302 (1876).
76
1d. at 257 (emphasis by the court).
7 The Western Farmer, 210 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir. 1954).
7 8 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, supra note 21, at 1050, 1051.
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which the United States has not signed. The problems which the
United States faces in relation to maritime limitation law are
not unique. Other nations in working toward their solutions
have been much more ready to cooperate with each other. This
is perhaps one major reason why the United States currently
seems to be in such an unsound position. While most of the
world's seafaring nations have been active in the series of
Brussels conventions the United States action has been notably
restrained.
IV.

International Conventions

The historical lack of international uniformity in maritime limitation practice is readily apparent. This want of
uniformity was so obviously unsound that the International
Maritime Committee was-developed in 1897 with the official
support of the Belgian government. It consisted principally
of jurists with a knowledge of maritime affairs, most of
whom were from the major seafaring nations of the world.
Their goal was to repiesent the interests of the shipping
industry, cargo owners, the traveling public and underwriters.
Their work has resulted in a series of conventions covering a
broad spectrum of international seafaring problems. The first
conVention concerning the present topic occurred in 1910, and
dealt with the subject of collisions. The latest was in May,
1962, dealing with the "liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships".80
A.

The 1910 Convention

Article Four of the International Convention for Unification of Certain Rules of Law With Respect to Collisions
Between Vessels, signed at Brussels, September 23, 1910, was
of major significance. 8 1 That section concerned itself with
the proportionate fault rule in the situation previously
described as a "both to blame" collision of vessels. The
Convention adopted the position previously relied on in
England and the Continent: that the liability of each ship
was governed by the degree of fault of each vessel. The
thought was that this position was clearly the majority view
on the subject and, therefore, the treaty would be a first step
toward uniformity in international maritime matters. Uniformity
was important because it discouraged forum shopping, increased
certainty of result in a confused area of the law, and made
judicial administration simpler in the increasing number of disputes with international elements. The drafters of the con7 9 COLOMBOS,
supra note 24, at 354.
8 0 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, supra note
8 1 Id.

at 1048.
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21, at 1071-1079.

vention were correct to the extent that the treaty received
almost unanimous support from the nations of the world, with
the notable exception of the United States. 8 2 As of today the
Convention of 1910 has been ratified or acceded to by over
fifty nations, including all of the major maritime powers
83
except the United States.

The reason the American position has been so arbitrary
may not be thoroughly understood unless the whole perspective
of United States maritime law is considered. The limited reformation of limitation laws in 1936 did not treat the subject
of proportionate fault with so much as a comment. The reason
then may have been the legislators' preoccupation with the
specter of the Morro Castle. Recently, however, as in the 1962
and 1963 Hearings, 8 4the position of proportionate fault has become more popular.
The basic lines of disagreement have been drawn between
85
the cargo owners who favor the present law and the ship owners
who favor adopting the principles of the 1910 Convention. The
cargo interests oppose any change because of the unique advantage
which they presently hold under American law. In the typical
collision, because of Federal legislation, cargo owners cannot
recover directly from the carrying vessel for damages due to the
errors of that ship; however, they can recover in full from the
non-carrying ship if she is even partly at fault. 8 6 The noncarrying ship then recoups half its payment to the cargo owner
from the carrying ship in a mutual fault situation because of
the American principle of damage division. Therefore, the
cargo interests are permitted to do indirectly what they can87
not, by the express declaration of Congress, do directly.
8 2 Id.

at 1050, 1051.

8_ _d.
8 zSenate
4
bill 2313 discussed in the 1962 Hearings and number
555 in the 1963 Hearings both substantially adopt the Brussels
Convention of 1910.
8 5 Realistically
speaking it must be noted that the real
controversy is most often between the insurers of these two
separate branches of the industry.
861963 Hearings supra note 3, 25 65. The prohibition against
cargo recovering from its carrying vessel is found in the Harter
"If the owner of
Act 27 Stat. 445, c. 105 (1893), 46 U.S.C. 192.
any vessel transporting merchandise. . .shall exercise due
diligence to make the vessel in all respects seaworthy. . . neither

the vessel, her owner or owners,. . .shall become or be held
responsible for damages or loss. .... "
8 7 See,
Harter Act, id. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act §4(2)
(1936), cited in 1963 Hearings, supra., note 3, at 65, "'Neither
the carkier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage
(to its cargo) arising or resulting from- (an) act, neglect or
default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the
carrier. . . .'"
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"The anomaly is sharpened by the fact that, if it [the carrying
ship] alone had been negligent, it would have paid nothing on
account of its own cargo, for that cargo would have had nobody
to sue." 8 8 The cargo owner, of course, is always able to collect from his underwriter, so the only real loss is suffered by
that insurance carrier. In foreign jurisdictions which have
adopted the proportionate fault rule under the 1910 Convention,
the cargo owner who utilizes such vessels cannot collect from
the carrying vessel, and can collect from the non-carrying
89
vessel only to the extent she is at fault.
A further argument against adopting the 1910 Convention
is that the courts in the United States are hesitant and untried at using such an unfamiliar concept which arguably is not
even popular in British courts. 9 0 At least some courts in the
United States have expressed the opposite opinion, speaking in
such terms as our ". . Tobstinate cleaving to the ancient rule
which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations. . .
As for the inexperience of American courts in handling the proportionate fault rule, this objection must also seemingly fail,
because it has already been applied in United States maritime
law as comparative negligence,

".

. .in litigation involving

death and injury cases under the general maritime law of torts
and unseaworthiness, as well as under the Death on the High
Seas Act (46 U.S.C. 766) and the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 688).1192
In spite of the great advantage of international uniformity
that militates strongly toward adopting the 1910 Convention,
such an accession by the United States would pose problems.
It is argued that the legislation seeking to enact the 1910
Convention into American law defines liability in terms of
fault. 9 3 While in certain instances the word might mean something other than negligence, it would be quite possible to
equate fault with negligence under the proposed legislation.
In that case, the argument continues, the shipowner's warranty
of seaworthiness, which presently operates without the necessity
of showing negligence, 9 4 would be destroyed. With this
destruction, one of the areas most effective remedies against
the owner would be lost, particularly with respect to sea88GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 153

(1957).

891963 Hearings, supra note 3, at 65.
901962 Hearings, supra note 3, at 229. Other faults with the
1910 Convention are detailed, id., at 228-238.
9 1 National
Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. United States of America,
183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950).
921963 Hearings, supra note 2, at 13.
93
1d.
94ILMORE & BLACK, supra note 88, at 58,59. Seaworthiness
relates to the condition in which an owner must maintain his
vessel. A finding of unseaworthiness. . .
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men. 9 5 Finally, the 1910 Convention and its American version
impose a two year statute of limitations that conflicts with
the present three year statute under the Jones Act, 9 6 or the
rule of laches otherwise now in effect.
While it is impossible to pinpoint the reason for its
failure, the bill seeking to adopt the Brussels Convention
of 1910 was never reported out of Senate committee in 1962
or 1963. 9 7 One reason for the failure of this subcommittee
to report the bill out can be attributed to the opposing
factions that represented the shipping companies and the
cargo-plaintiff group at the Hearings in 1962 and 1963.98
These two groups had been meeting for months, attempting to
hammer out a reasonable compromise, but the negotiations
finally broke down. The irreconcilability of their positions
is reflected in this statement:
"We have reached no conclusion and agreement with anybody on the subject matter. We
met for a period of 4 months. . .and we reached no basic
agreement on any point."19 9 Apparently, with such a split of
opinion between the parties involved, the committee was unwilling to step into the breach and propose any measure at
all. In 1963, there was no public outcry to revise the law
and this as much as anything else led to its defeat.
B.

The 1924 Convention

The 1924 Brussels Convention--the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation
of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels--attempted compromise on an international scale. It was an effort to combine
the British concept of sum certain and the American doctrine
95"is essentially a species of liability without fault,
analogous to well known instances in our law. Derived from
and shaped to meet the hazards which performing the service
imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions of
negligence nor contractual in character. .

.

."

Seas Shipping

Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 (1945).
961962 Hearings, supra note 3, at 161.
9 7 Those
who are perplexed as to why the alternative route
of simply seeking the "advice and consent" of the Senate and
ratifying the Convention was not followed, will be answered by
saying that that attempt failed also. "The Brussels Collision
Convention of 1910 was signed by the four American delegates.
It was not sent to the Senate for its advice and consent until
1937. It was favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign
Relations in 1939, with reservations, but the Senate did not
act. The Convention was returned to the President in 1947
without having been acted upon." 1963 Hearings, supra note 3,
at 132.
98 Id.
at 162, 163.
9 9 Id.
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of limitation of the owners liability to the value of the vessel
following the accident. In doing so the Convention adopted the
worst element of both plans. 1924 Brussels Convention reads:
Art. 1
The liability of the owner of a seagoing vessel
is limited to an amount equal to the value of
the vessel. . .in respect of;

(1) Compensation due to third parties by reason
of damage caused by collision .
Art. 3
. . .The value of the vessel shall be based upon

the condition of the vessel at the. . .time of
her arrival at that first port [reached after the
collision].
Art. 1
. . .Provided that,.

. .the liability. . .shall

not exceed an aggregate sum equal to 8 pounds
100
sterling per ton of the vessel's tonnage.
In effect the convention removed the sum certain concept, since
if the ship were lost there would be no liability, and used the
8 pounds as an upper limit on the injured parties' possible
recovery if the ship survived. At least under the American
system, if the vessel survived basically intact, the claimants
were usually adequately protected.
There was never any widespread acceptance of the treaty by
the major seafaring nations of the world. France was the largest
maritime power to accept it, but few of those nations normally0
following the French did so in regard to the 1924 Convention.
Britain continued to follow the sum certain system, and in the
United States only brief mention was made of the Treaty in the
1935 Congressional Hearings. 1 0 2 Clearly this Treaty had major
faults, e.g., its failure to protect the injured parties, but
10 0 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS, supra, note 21, at 1052, 1053.
101Id. at 1058.
102For the caustic comments of Mr. William Sirovitch on this
convention see, 1935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 103,104. The
1924 Convention was cited by the shipowner interests as the
exterme to which they would not attempt to push Congress. It represented the maximum gain for them that they were willing to
forego to see legislation enacted that would put a much higher,
but still very limited, ceiling on their possible liability. Id.
at 101-106.
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the events of that period were partly responsible. Inflation
was rampant on a world-wide basis, and as never before big
business rather than the individual was the dominant interest
of society. Soon after the Treaty's proposal came the great
depression; political and economic leaders turned inward to
solve the crisis, and this convention on shipowner's liability
was forgotten.
C.

The 1957 Convention

Following World War II there was a resurgence of internationalism. This was reflected in the development of the
United Nations and other international economic and social
organizations. The co-operative effort of the Brussel's
Conference was likewise spurred into action, this time at the
behest of the International Maritime Committee at Brighton,
England. 1 0 3 Following a conference at Madrid in 1955, the
International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the
Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships was adopted. I 0 4 The
agreement reached by that Convention represented the results of
over half a century of efforts by maritime nations to resolve
the conflicting elements of their liability provisions in
regard to shipowners. New elements were contained in the Treaty,
but in effect it was an adoption of the British principle of a
sum certain.
The articles of major significance of this Treaty were
brought up before the
made part of the proposed legislation 105
The effort was
1962 and 1963 Congressional Hearings.
to the Senate
the
Convention
apparently made to avoid bringing
for its advice and consent because of the requirement of a
106
two-thirds majority.
By the Treaty and the Amekican legislative versions of it,
S. 2314 (1962) and S. 556(1963), limitation is extended to all
personal injury, death, or property claims arising on ship-.
board or in connected land injuries. There is no limitation
provision for contract claims of the owner, either to the crew
or third parties. 0 7 The Convention established a fund approach
for all types of injury along the lines of British law. The
1031962 Hearings, supra note 3, at 55.
1 0 4 1d. Done at Brussels, on October 10, 1957.
See, for text
of treaty, British Shipping Laws, supra note 21, at 1058-1064.
1 0 5 Compare text of Treaty id.
with the proposed legislation;
S. 2314 1962 Hearings, supra note 2, at 2-6, S. 556, 1963 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 2-6.
1 0 6 1d. at 12.
107162 Hearings, supra note 2, at 81, 82.
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values set out are $67.00 per ship's ton for property claims,
and $140.00 per ship's ton for personal injury and death claims.
The amount which is set aside for personal injury and death is
to be used exclusively for that purpose, and if all such claims
are not paid off, the claimants will then share the $67.00 per
ton fund with the property claims on a ratable basis. 1 0 8

Furthermore, limitation privileges are extended to a broader
range of charter parties, giving a protection that is hardly
needed.109
To avoid the multiplicity of suits that have hindered
shipowners, the fund which must be established by the owner
under the Convention may be deposited in any of the adhering
nations. 1 1 0 Under the 1957 Convention as reflected in the
proposed American law an owner could not be forced to set up
funds in more than one location if he chose to deposit the
original sum in: the port where the accidents occurred;
in
the first port of call after the accident; or at the port of
1
disembarkation for persons or cargo claiming damage. I
The United States thus far has rejected the 1957 Convention
and has continued to follow its domestic law. Following the
Madrid meeting in 1955, a position paper was prepared by the
United States government in conjunction with the Maritime Law
Association to articulate the goals of the American delegation
at Brussels. 1 1 2 First, the United States opposed allowing the
shipowner to make any choice of forum. It was thought that
this would work an undue hardship on American claimants.
Second, it was objected that Article 1 of the proposed 1957
Convention would change the burden of proof regarding privity
of the owner. The government favored the present rule that
the owner must carry the burden. Third, the paper argued that

the limitation amount was too low and that it discriminated
against the older, less valuable ships, since the liability

was to be measured in every case on tonnage alone. Fourth,
the attempt to force acceptance of the treaty by allowing
signatory states to disregard any limitation in regard to
ships of non-signatory powers was protested as being against
the principle of international comitv.
Last, the expansion of
108S. REP. NO. 1602, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962).
1 0 9 Eyer, supra note 42, at
384.
1 1 0 British
Shipping Laws, supra note 26, at 1062.
But see
Note, 68 YALE L. J. 1676, 1683 (1959); the convention does not
preclude litigation in multiple nations.
1111963 Hearings, supra note 2, at 44, 48, 52.
1121963 Hearings, supra note 2, at 115.
But see Id. at 50-61.
For text of position paper see Id. 81.
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limitation availablilty to masters and a broader range of charter
parties seemed objectionable.
The opponents of the enacting legislation in the United
States often referred to the fact that none of the American
points were acceded to at the Brussels Convention.113 Particularly,
the provision allowing the shipowner to choose the forum was
attacked as unfiar to claimants. It was argued that the added
expense and difficulty in obtaining foreign counsel could in
many instances effectively bar any recovery. The United States
courts, however, could protect the rights of such a claimant
if they concluded that the place where the fund was deposited
made it not "actually available"; of course, this would depend
on judicial interpretation in each instance. The argument
advanced that there might be a devaluation of the fund deposited
in a foreign country I 14 is also met to a certain extent by the
American courts' right to determine the availability. Nonetheless, the procedures involved in dealing with a foreign fund
in foreign courts would be more costly and time consuming to
American claimants115
The fear was expressed about the 1957 Convention, as it
had been about the 1910 Convention, that the adoption of the
British phraseology concerning privity would cause adverse
restriction of the American seaworthiness doctrine. 1 1 6 This
would be particularly true in regard to seamen who are turning
117
in ever increasing numbers to this doctrine for their recoveries.
Present law refers to the privity of the owner, but the proposed
statute refers to "the actual fault or privity".1 1 8 Therefore,
the opponents of the measure say that it is not inconceivable
that the courts might give a more narrow construction to the
would allow the owner to limit his
words "privity plus" which
119
liability more easily.
Finally, it was suggested that the 1957 Convention is not
even the uniform international standard that its proponents claim
it to be. 1 2 0 At the time of this assertion only Canada and Great
Britain had adopted it, but today the statement is no less
relevant. The United States herself has proposed a variation of
the 1957 Convention in the law that seeks to enact it. This
l1 3 1d. at 81, 151.
1147I. at 78,79.
iiI5-Ido at 44,48.
ll6o at 158.
1 Comment, 2 VANDERBILT INTERNATIONAL 59, 62
1181963 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5.
11 9 Id
at 158.
12U0Ido at 94.
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(1969).

modification makes it explicit that insurors have the right to
12 1
limit their liability as would the shipowners they represent.
In the United States this would constitute a federal overruling
of several of the states' direct action statutes which deprive
the underwriters of the limitation benefit. 1 2 2 On the international scene this would provide but one example of how the
Convention is shaped to meet each nation's specific needs at
the expense of uniformity. Most of the nations of the world are
waiting to see if the large maritime countries accept a uniform
convention. Therefore the United States is in a very important
position. If she adopts the whole Convention it will hasten the
development of an international norm, but the question is
relevant: should this be done in the face of the apparent defects
contained in the articles of the 1957 Convention?
Proponents of the Convention seem to present the same reasons
for its enactment as were bffered for the 1910 Convention. This
is not to say they are not valid or persuasive. Adoption of the
Convention would give the American shipping industry the same
advantages already held by the industry of foreign nations. The
changes espoused by the Convention would rectify the presently
inequitable American system, and American ratification of the
Convention would help bring about international maritime uniformity.
Would, however, the Convention solve all the problems of American
or international shipping disasters? That is very doubtful at
best. New legislation would necessitate a whole series of new
court interpretations that would keep the several nations still
widely divergent, and the Convention in its terms of limitation
would at best be a stopgap measure. No new method of determining
a reasonably flexible method of limitation has been developed
and the fixed amounts of the fund would soon be out of date and
unreasonably low. Finally, the spirit of unlimited liability is
too strong to allow the 1957 Convention to be accepted as it is.
This last point is demonstrated by observing two areas of
special importance which exist in international maritime law
today: nuclear ships and oil pollution. The Brussels Convention
123
of 1962 concerning the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships
holds to a very strict liability for owners. Upon proof of
nuclear damage of any sort caused by the nuclear characteristics
of his ship, the owner is held absolutely liable for the damage.
No fault of the operator need be shown, and no set-offs are
allowed. The only defense available to a defendant is that the
claimant intentionally brought about the accident. Further,
±2±1963 Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (§8b).
1 2 2 See materials
cited note 67, supra.
1 2 3British Shipping
Laws, supra note 21, at 1071.
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the Convention does not exclude liability brought about by forms
of force majeure. Likewise in the area of oil pollution,1 2 4 the
1954 Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea
by Oil imposes strict rules for the dumping of wastes and severe
penalties for their violation by accident or otherwise. 1 2 5 The
United States has adopted this latter Convention and has been
deeply involved in legislation of its own to protect the water
from pollution. 12 6 Presently, there are indications that there
are those in the Department of State
who wish to see the owners'
liability extended even further. 1 2 7
V.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion indicates that some changes must
be made in United States law, whether by legislation or convention. The trend is clearly away from limitation and it is
difficult to believe that the 1957 Convention can be adopted
intact. It is no longer feasible to speak in terms of limiting
liability to a fixed standard. What must be developed is a
flexibility that takes into account the type of ship involved
and the degree of damage she can generate. This can be
expedited to a large extent by the underwriters'working in a
close accord with the ship owners and claimant representatives.
The industry and its insurors seem peculiarly fixed in the
fantasies of another era as they play the game according to
rules that seem unchanging, while their world crumbles around
them.
1 2 4 The

threat of oil pollution and the damage it causes is
increasing. Each year, more than 700 million tons of petroleum
are carried over the seas and while the pre-World War II tankers
had a capacity of 15,000 tons, the modern ones being build today,
such as the Idemitsu Maru, are close to 300,000 tons. Some ships
being planned or having their keels presently laid will be well
over 500,000 tons. The possibility of these ships becoming involved in maritime disaster is ever present, as was evidenced by
the Torrey Canyon; the damages that are produced are catastrophic
and the entire ecology of the water may be upset by the introduction of large quantities of oil.
1 2 5 Temperly, 11 British
Shipping Laws, 1692-1733 (1963).
1 2 6 Nanda, The Torrey
Canyon Disaster; Some Legal Aspects,
44 DENVER L.J. 400, 401 (1967).
1 2 7 Gerity, supra note
23, at 9, Dept. State Memo May 15,
"The United States Government believes that a new convention
1968:
in the area should provide for liability without fault. . .to
cover all reasonably foreseeable damages and should be sufficiently
flexible to allow fur the effect of inflation on property and
personal values. . .'

The sum of $30,000,000.00 as a limitation

amount was discussed."
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Limitation has ceased to be the tool it had been during the
14th century when it served to encourage the increase of foreign
commerce. Ships today are no longer owned by men; they are owned
by corporations. Losses are no longer suffered by the owner but
are absorbed by insurance underwriters. If limitation of
liability were still a subsidy, it could no longer be morally
justified. If the government wishes to promote this industry,
it may do so, but not at the expense of injured parties. "If
shipowners really need an additional subsidy, Congress can give
it to them without making injured seamen bear the cost.",1 28
On the other hand, an unwarranted removal of all limitation at
this time would be unfortuante.
In the short run two steps should be undertaken while more
comprehensive changes are contemplated. First, the 1910
Convention containing the proportionate fault rule should be
enacted at once. This-measure alone would be a great aid to
the shipping industry without unduly affecting cargo owners or
personal injury claimants. Second, the limitation funds required
to be deposited under the Sirovich Amendment should be increased
to a reasonable figure from the present $60.00 per ton. Admittedly
this is only a stop-gap measure and would work certain hardships,
but an adequate basis for recovery must be assured at once.
Beyond these elements, those reforms presented earlier should be
worked for on a formal basis by the disputant parties. International uniformity is unfortunately still many years off, but in
the meantime American maritime limitation law must be thoroughly
revised.
1 2 8 Maryland

v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1957),

(Dissenting

opinion).

Joseph N. Barker
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